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I. INTRODUCTION
Wicked Weed Brewing Company opened its doors in 2012 to a thriving North
Carolina craft beer scene, and it grew like a weed. 1 In 2014, Wicked Weed
introduced the Funkatorium—a popular taproom and barrel-aging facility.2 The
following year, the brewery opened a third production facility, which included a
40,000 square foot, 50-barrel brewhouse. 3 To put that number into perspective, this
facility alone is capable of brewing 1,550 gallons of beer in a single batch. 4 Then
in 2016, Wicked Weed opened a 57,000 square foot brewery and barrelhouse built
on 17 acres; the company’s largest facility.5 After opening four production
facilities in less than five years, the brewery employed over 200 workers 6 and
produced over 150 unique beers a year. 7 Wicked Weed’s creations have won
numerous awards in notable tasting competitions, 8 and the brewery itself won the
title of best craft brewery in North Carolina and in the 17-state South.9
In May 2017, Wicked Weed announced what it called a “strategic partnership”
with The High End, a division of the Belgian beer giant Anheuser-Busch InBev
(“AB InBev”).10 In other words, “Wicked Weed sold out to a Big Brewery.” 11
Why would a wildly successful craft brewery decide to sell to a large
corporation?12 Looking at the beer industry as a whole, the trend is not an
uncommon one.13 In fact, by 2018 Wicked Weed was the tenth craft brewery
1. Press Release, Anheuser-Busch, Wicked Weed Brings Flavor and Funk to the High End (May 3, 2017),
http://www.anheuser-busch.com/newsroom/2017/05/wicked-weed.html (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
2. Jane Lothrop, Wicked Weed to Build Fourth Production Facility, BREWBOUND (Mar. 17, 2016, 11:09
AM), https://www.brewbound.com/news/wicked-weed-to-build-fourth-production-facility (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
3. Id.
4. See Defining a Brewery by Barrels, KALISPELL BREWING CO., http://kalispellbrewing.com/wp/definin
g-a-brewery-by-barrels/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(explaining one barrel contains 31 gallons of beer).
5. Lothrop, supra note 2.
6. Travis M. Andrews, ‘Treachery’: Craft Brewery Wicked Weed Enrages Fans by Partnering with Big
Beer, CHI. TRIB. (May 5, 2017, 11:38 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-wicked-weed-inbevbacklash-20170505-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
7. Chris Furnari, Anheuser-Busch to Purchase Wicked Weed Brewing, BREWBOUND (May 3, 2017, 9:35
AM), https://www.brewbound.com/news/anheuser-busch-purchase-wicked-weed-brewing (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
8. Id.
9. Andrews, supra note 6.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See id. (explaining Wicked Weed’s rapid success and subsequent sale).
13. Matt Allyn, Is That Really Craft Beer? 33 Surprising Corporate Brewers, MEN’S JOURNAL,
http://www.mensjournal.com/food-drink/drinks/is-that-really-craft-beer-21-surprising-corporate-brewers-

404

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 50
acquired by AB InBev since 2011. 14 Other notable transactions include Big Beer
conglomerate Constellation Brands’ 2015 acquisition of Ballast Point Brewing
Company for the eye-popping price tag of one-billion dollars,15 and Lagunitas
Brewing Company’s 2015 sale of half of its ownership interest to Dutch brewer
Heineken.16 Then in May 2017, coinciding with the Wicked Weed-AB InBev
transaction, Heineken bought Lagunitas’ remaining interest to take 100%
ownership of the company. 17 These horizontal transactions, where one brewery
purchases interest in another brewery, are part of the recent consolidation of the
beer market.18
With the assistance of the alcohol industry’s legal framework, Big Beer is
smothering its craft brewery competitors. 19 The United States’ legal system for
alcohol distribution, commonly called the “three-tier system,” and beer franchise
laws are antiquated and allow Big Beer to influence marketplace access. 20
Unfortunately, the three-tier system often places craft breweries at a disadvantage
because small breweries lack the resources of their larger counterparts.21 As noted
by associates of craft breweries whom have chosen to partner with Big Beer,
successful craft breweries looking to grow and expand to other geographic
markets effectively have only one option—join Big Beer.22 The obvious route,
selling ownership interests to Big Beer, provides craft breweries with the resources
they need to grow, such as access to ingredients, equipment, and a wider
distribution area.23 While these partnerships may be beneficial for the handful of
20150923 (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (listing 33 popular
craft brewery mergers and acquisitions by Big Beer companies).
14. Furnari, supra note 7 (providing the other AB InBev craft beer acquisitions are Goose Island, Blue
Point, Brewing, 10 Barrel Brewing, Elysian Brewing, Golden Road, Breckenridge Brewery, Four Peaks Brewing,
Devil’s Backbone, and Karbach Brewing).
15. Peter Rowe, Ballast Point to be Sold to N.Y. Corporation for $1B, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. (Nov. 16,
2015, 8:51 AM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/entertainment/beer/sdut-ballast-point-sold-coronaconstellation-brands-2015nov16-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. PHILIP H. HOWARD, TOO BIG TO ALE? GLOBALIZATION AND CONSOLIDATION IN THE BEER INDUSTRY
1 (2013), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2268705 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(explaining that Big Beer has grown from less than 50% of total sales in 2005 to over 70% in 2012).
19. Michael Kiser, Critical Drinking—On Breaking Up “Ma Beer” and The Three Tier, GOOD BEER
HUNTING (Aug. 31, 2017), http://goodbeerhunting.com/blog/2017/8/30/critical-drinking-breaking-up-ma-beerand-the-three-tier (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
20. Id.
21. Marc Sorini, Understanding the Three-Tier System: Its Impacts on U.S. Craft Beer and You, CRAFT
BEER.COM (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.craftbeer.com/craft-beer-muses/three-tier-system-impacts-craft-beer (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
22. Kate Taylor, People Are Furious That This Craft Brewer ‘Sold Out’ to Anheuser Busch—Here’s Why
the Founders Say They’re Wrong,
BUSINESS INSIDER (May 3, 2017, 5:03 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/wicked-weed-founders-take-on-sell-out-criticism-2017-5 (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining from the owners’ perspective that the transaction was an
opportunity for growth of craft beer, not inhibition).
23. Id.
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Big Beer-owned craft breweries, they come to the market at the cost of fair
competition, consumer choice, and product variety. 24
To improve competition and promote variety in the marketplace, regulators
must amend the existing alcohol regulatory system to match the current market.25
Although three-tier distribution is an imperfect legal system, it is a necessary
regulation and safeguards against legitimate competition concerns, namely a
complete Big Beer takeover. 26 To solve the issue of large-scale market
consolidation, craft brewers should first look to the federal government to help
protect the craft beer industry by closely scrutinizing horizontal transactions under
an antitrust analysis. 27 After reducing market consolidation, regulations should
focus on creating a true independent distribution tier 28 and reconsidering current
beer franchise laws.29
Part II of this Comment attempts to define “craft” beer and the values of the
culture that are threatened by market consolidation. 30 Part III reviews the history
behind regulations in the beer market, and the development of the three-tier alcohol
distribution system and beer franchise laws. 31 Part IV examines how current
regulations affect the craft beer industry and shape the relationships between the
tiers.32 In light of the growing concerns of a monopoly on the craft beer market,
Part V discusses antitrust actions in the craft beer industry and how scrutinizing
future brewery acquisitions under an antitrust analysis will help protect the
market.33 Part VI then suggests further changes to alcohol regulation that will
prevent consolidation and promote variety and consumer choice. 34
II. THE CRAFT BEER MARKET
The Brewer’s Association defines craft breweries as “small, independent and
traditional.”35 “Small” means that the brewery produces less than six million
barrels of beer annually.36 “Independent” refers to the restriction that a craft

24. Dan Croxall, Let’s Make Sure We Are Talking About the Same Things: Tied-House Laws the ThreeTier System, CRAFT BEER L. PROF (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.craftbeerprofessor.com/2017/02/lets-make-suretalking-things-tied-house-laws-three-tier-system/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
25. See id. (explaining that without laws, the market would unfavorably benefit large corporations).
26. Kiser, supra note 19.
27. Infra Part V.
28. Infra Part VI.A.
29. Infra Part VI.B.
30. Infra Part II.
31. Infra Part III.
32. Infra Part IV.
33. Infra Part V.
34. Infra Part VI.
35. CANDACE L. MOON & STACY ALLURA HOSTETTER, BREW LAW 101: A LEGAL GUIDE TO OPENING A
BREWERY —CALIFORNIA EDITION 1 (Paula L. Fleming & Doug McNair eds., 2015).
36. Id.
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brewery may not have greater than 25% ownership by another industry member. 37
“Traditional” means that breweries produce the majority of their beer from
traditional ingredients. 38 While the Brewer’s Association has set forth a technical
definition, the hallmark of craft beer is the culture of innovation, collaboration, and
community.39
The craft beer culture is the foundation of the industry, and the values that craft
beer embodies are important to both the industry and its patrons. 40 AB InBev’s
acquisition of Wicked Weed garnered widespread notoriety and disdain because
the large corporation’s values run counter to the craft culture. 41 Many, both inside
and outside of the craft beer industry, wrote articles criticizing the transaction and
questioning what it meant for the craft beer market.42 As a testament to this
disapproval, over 50 of the 70 craft breweries scheduled to attend Wicked Weed’s
annual Funkatorium Invitational tasting competition withdrew, forcing Wicked
Weed to postpone the competition indefinitely.43
From 2015 to 2016, the number of craft breweries in the United States
increased by over 16% to an all-time high of 5,234. 44 Craft breweries’ total dollar
share of the domestic beer market, at just under 22%, was also at an all-time high
at the close of 2016—and Big Beer noticed.45 The five largest brewers in America
account for nearly 80% of the market share, and Big Beer companies are actively
looking to become more involved in the craft beer sector. 46 Anheuser-Busch alone
possesses a domestic market share of over 40 percent.47 The backlash from the
Wicked Weed acquisition demonstrates that people are beginning to notice Big

37. Id.
38. Id. at 2 (listing the four traditional ingredients of beer are water, hops, malt, and yeast).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Carol Viau, AB InBev Scoops Up Asheville’s Wicked Weed: Purchase Leaves Craft Beer Lovers in
Dismay, THE MOUNTAINEER (May 7, 2017), https://www.themountaineer.com/news/business/ab-inbev-scoopsup-asheville-s-wicked-weed/article_a4bb06a8-336b-11e7-9644-5b594557e797.html (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review).
42. Compare id., with Taylor, supra note 22 (explaining a selling brewery owner’s response to social
backlash).
43. Press Release, Funkatorium Invitational (May 9, 2017),
https://www.wickedweedbrewing.com/funkatorium-invitational-update/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
44. Press Release, Brewer’s Association, Steady Growth for Small and Independent Brewers (Mar. 28,
2017), https://www.brewersassociation.org/press-releases/2016-growth-small-independent-brewers/ (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
45. Id.
46. Alastair Bland, Craft Beer, Brought to You by Big Beer, NPR (July 28, 2017, 12:03 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2017/07/28/539760477/craft-beer-brought-to-you-by-big-beer (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review); Industry Fast Facts, NAT’ L BEER WHOLESALERS ASS’N,
https://www.nbwa.org/resources/industry-fast-facts (last visited Apr. 8, 2018) (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
47. Industry Fast Facts, supra note 46.
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Beer conglomerates’ attempts to capitalize on the rising popularity of craft beer.48
While no definitive monopoly over the beer market currently exists, many
people believe it is a near monopoly, or headed in that direction. 49 One article even
goes so far as to dub Big Beer companies “Ma Beer,” a nod to the AT&T monopoly
over the telecommunications sector popularized as “Ma Bell.” 50 “Ma Bell” was
later dismantled through antitrust measures, and the article suggests a similar
application to Ma Beer.51 Another news site prefaced its article on the recent
consolidation of the beer market with a graphic depicting Monopoly mascot Rich
Uncle Pennybags (representing Big Beer) standing on a tap handle holding bags of
money with his hat placed on every tap handle. 52 The federal government seems to
share the same sentiment; the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
recently examined Anheuser-Busch’s motives in light of their merger with
SABMiller, the company that brews Coors.53 The DOJ required notice of and
promised to scrutinize any future Anheuser-Busch craft brewery acquisitions.54
Although the craft beer market has continued to grow, the trend towards
consolidation and monopolization of the market threatens craft breweries and the
craft beer culture. 55
III. THE REGULATION OF ALCOHOL
The current landscape for alcohol regulation began forming with the passage
of the Twenty-First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which ended
Prohibition.56 The regulations that have formed since Prohibition act together to
hinder the growth of the modern craft beer market. 57 Changes in the dominant
paradigm over decades of brewing without the equivalent shift in the regulatory
framework have resulted in a system where manufacturing rights and relationships
48. Bland, supra note 46 (describing Big Beer’s buy-out of craft breweries and squeeze-out of the
distribution industry).
49. See generally Kiser, supra note 19; Adam Davidson, Are We in Danger of a Beer Monopoly?, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/magazine/beer-mergers.html (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the recent trends in the American beer market towards a
monopoly).
50. Kiser, supra note 19.
51. Id.
52. Dave Infante, The Great Craft Beer Sellout, THRILLIST (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.thrillist.com/dri
nk/nation/craft-breweries-selling-out-big-beer-companies (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
53. Diane Bartz, Exclusive, U.S. Queries AB InBev On Distribution Incentives and Merger Probe,
REUTERS (May 24, 2016, 10:07 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-a-b-i-craftbeers-probeexclusive/exclusive-u-s-queries-ab-inbev-on-distribution-incentives-amid-merger-probe-idUSKCN0YG0EG
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
54. Kiser, supra note 19.
55. Brian D. Anhalt, Crafting a Model State Law for Today’s Beer Industry, 21 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 162, 190 (2016).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
57. Kiser, supra note 19.
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are used to stifle and overpower craft breweries. 58 Section A explains the history
behind alcohol regulation that led to the dominant three-tier distribution system
and how it functions today. 59 Section B details the history of the enactment of beer
franchise laws and their effect on the beer industry. 60
A. The Three-Tiered Distribution System
Subsection 1 describes the origins and implementation of the three-tier
system.61 Subsection 2 elaborates on the role of each of the tiers in the system. 62
1. Roots of the Three-Tier System
The Eighteenth Amendment, which instituted Prohibition, was rooted in the
temperance movement. 63 The temperance movement sought to legally limit or
proscribe alcohol consumption based on the idea that alcohol “spawned a multitude
of social, political, and economic evils.”64 The movement particularly targeted
tied-houses, a common distribution scheme of the pre-Prohibition era.65
“Tied-house” is the term for a retailer that is controlled by an alcohol
manufacturer, either through direct ownership or exclusive contract agreements. 66
The tied-house system led to a distribution structure where the producer controlled
both the production and sale of beer, which resulted in numerous bars, each
exclusively serving only the controlling producer’s alcohol.67 These bars and pubs
competed for business by lowering prices and offering other incentives to drink at
their bars, which promoted a culture of overconsumption. 68 In 1920, the
Prohibition banned the production and sale of alcohol in the United States, and
tied-houses faded.69

58. Id.
59. Infra Part III.A.
60. Infra Part III.B.
61. Infra Part III.A.1.
62. Infra Part III.A.2.
63. GARRETT PECK, THE PROHIBITION H ANGOVER: ALCOHOL IN AMERICA FROM DEMON RUM TO CULT
CABERNET 9 (2009).
64. DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 8 (2d ed. 2000).
65. Ryan R. Lee, Prohibition’s Hangover: How Antiquated Illinois Beer-Law is Abused by Big Beer to
the Substantial Detriment of Craft Breweries, 37 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 144, 149–50 (2016).
66. Tim Heffernan, Last Call: Industry Giants Are Threatening to Swallow up America’s Carefully
Regulated Alcohol Industry, and Remake America in the Image of Booze-Soaked Britain, WASH. MONTHLY (Nov.
2012), https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/novdec-2012/last-call/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
67. Id.
68. See id. (explaining that some bars would also offer gambling or prostitution as an incentive to attract
customers).
69. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; Lee, supra note 65, at 150.
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After a tumultuous few years where alcohol was prohibited but remained
prevalent in society, 70 the ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment in 1933
ended the Prohibition.71 Although the Prohibition was largely unsuccessful, some
semblance of the temperance movement remained, and Congress sought to avoid
the under-regulated and profit-driven system that led to the Prohibition.72
The first section of the Twenty-First Amendment repealed the Prohibition,
while the second banned “[t]he transportation or importation into any State,
Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof.” 73 The second section allotted
states the power to regulate the transportation, importation, and use of alcohol. 74
To avoid returning to the pre-Prohibition system, the federal government and every
state has passed some variation of a tied-house law that prohibits common
ownership interest between brewers and retailers. 75 The majority of states have
opted for the strongest protection against tied-houses by adopting the three-tier
distribution system. 76
2. The Three Tiers
In its pure form, three-tier distribution is the ultimate separation of the retailer
from the producer.77 The three-tier system separates the alcohol market into three
distinct categories, or “tiers”: producers, wholesalers, and retailers. 78 As producers,
brewers may only manufacture and package their beers. 79 Wholesalers are the
distributors who contract with producers to sell their products to retailers.80
Retailers then sell the products to consumers.81 Instituting the distributors as an
independent middleman either limits or eliminates the producers’ involvement and
interest in retailers, and severely curtails the ability of brewers to assist or
incentivize the lower two-tiers.82 The strict separation of the three tiers helps avoid
70. PECK, supra note 63, at 13–14 (explaining that Americans continued to drink alcohol after the 18th
Amendment, and Prohibition gave rise to organized crime in order to supply that alcohol).
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1.
72. Andrew D’Aversa, Brewing Better Law: Two Proposals to Encourage Innovation in America’s Craft
Beer Industry, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1465, 1473 (2017).
73. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
74. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 484 (2005) (“The aim of the Twenty-First Amendment was to allow
States to maintain an effective and uniform system for controlling liquor by regulating its transportation,
importation, and use.”).
75. Justin M. Welch, The Inevitability of the Brewpub: Legal Avenues for Expanding Distribution
Capabilities, 16 REV. LITIG. 173, 178 (1997).
76. D’Aversa, supra note 72.
77. Id. at 1475.
78. Sorini, supra note 21.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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overconsumption and other tied-house evils of the pre-Prohibition paradigm. 83
B. Beer Franchise Laws
Beer franchise laws that act in concert with the three-tier distribution system
are key developments that have created a lasting impact on the craft beer industry. 84
Franchise laws regulate the contractual relationship between the distribution and
production tiers.85 Like the three-tier distribution system, beer franchise laws
require some historical context to understand their role in the craft beer industry. 86
In the 1970s, state legislatures created beer franchise statutes to compensate
for an imbalance in bargaining power when the market was dominated by a handful
of large breweries interacting with numerous small distributors. 87 States designed
these statutes for a national market with less than 50 brewers and over 5,000
distributors,88 in stark contrast to the over 8,000 permitted brewers in the beer
market today.89 At the time, many small distributors carried only one brand of beer,
and the dynamic resulted in a large power imbalance where the small wholesalers
were at the mercy of the producer. 90 Breweries were much larger and had more
resources than distributors, which granted producers the power to choose from the
many small distributors. 91 This dynamic gave producers much influence over
distribution contracts and franchise negotiations. 92 The franchise laws statutorily
provided contractual protections for the distribution tier against the brewers. 93
To state it simply, franchise laws are “regulations about what you can and
cannot contract with distributors about.” 94 Franchise laws dictate contractual terms
of distribution agreements and may not be drafted around by parties to the
contract.95 The typical franchise law provides several contractual protections to
cure the perceived bargaining power imbalance. 96 Common franchise law
83. Id.
84. Anhalt, supra note 55, at 163.
85. Id. at 163–64.
86. See id. at 164 (explaining that beer franchise statutes were enacted to solve the particular issue of
imbalance of bargaining power at the time).
87. Id. at 174.
88. Steve Hindy, Free Craft Beer!, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/30/
opinion/sunday/free-craft-beer.html?_r=1 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
89. See Industry Fast Facts, supra note 46 (reporting data on the total number of breweries permitted by
the U.S. Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, not solely craft brewers).
90. Hindy, supra note 88.
91. Anhalt, supra note 55, at 174.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 164.
94. MOON & HOSTETTER, supra note 35, at 166.
95. MARC E. SORINI, BEER FRANCHISE LAW S UMMARY (2014), available at https://s3-us-west2.amazonaws.com/brewersassoc/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Beer-Franchise-Law-Summary.pdf (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
96. Id.
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protections include: termination protections, transfer protections, territorial
protections, and procedural protections and remedies. 97
Termination protections may greatly limit a brewer’s ability to terminate
contracts with a distributor.98 Some common termination protections include strict
definitions of “good cause” termination, notice and cure provisions, 99 and limiting
a brewery’s ability not to renew a distribution contract. 100 Transfer protections
limit a brewer’s ability to prevent a distributor from transferring their distribution
rights to another distribution company. 101 While most states either allow or require
distributors to notify brewers of a change of distribution rights, brewers are often
subject to clauses where ownership change cannot be “unreasonably” withheld,
giving brewers few rights to halt a transfer. 102 Territorial protections mandate
exclusive distribution territories for wholesalers 103 where other wholesalers are not
allowed to distribute the same brands. 104 Damages and procedural protections also
protect distributors in the event of litigation or other conflicts.105 Among these
protections are fee-shifting statutes to the prevailing party and “reasonable
compensation” provisions that provide for a distributor’s compensation, even for
good cause termination. 106 As further discussed below,107 these protections for
distributors make it very difficult for brewers to terminate or amend distribution
contracts, which can lead to disastrous consequences for breweries. 108
IV. EFFECTS OF CURRENT REGULATION
Three-tier distribution and beer franchise laws are the mainstays of beer
industry regulation. 109 In light of its historical origins, the current regulatory
scheme is a well-intentioned and relatively successful mechanism for achieving
post-Prohibition goals, such as preventing tied houses. 110 However, the recent
97. Anhalt, supra note 55, at 170.
98. MOON & HOSTETTER, supra note 35, at 167 (explaining that statutory termination protections may set
an “impractically high bar” for terminating a distribution agreement).
99. BEER FRANCHISE LAW S UMMARY, supra note 95.
100. Anhalt, supra note 55, at 175.
101. BEER FRANCHISE LAW S UMMARY, supra note 95.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Barry Kurtz & Bryan H. Clements, Beer Distribution Law as Compared to Traditional Franchise
Law, 33 FRANCHISE L. J. 397, 402 (2014).
105. BEER FRANCHISE LAW S UMMARY, supra note 95.
106. Anhalt, supra note 55, at 179.
107. Infra Part IV.C.
108. D’Aversa, supra note 72, at 1473.
109. See id. at 1475–76 (listing three-tier laws and franchise laws as two major regulations in the current
alcohol industry).
110. Dan Croxall, Ever Played Jenga? Too Many Exceptions to Tied-House Laws Render the Whole System
Vulnerable, CRAFT BEER L. PROF (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.craftbeerprofessor.com/2017/02/ever-playedjenga-many-exceptions-tied-house-laws-render-whole-system-vulnerable/ (on file with The University of the
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growth of the craft beer sector has changed the dynamic of the market and we are
seeing that the regulations formed since Prohibition hinder rather than help the
growth of modern craft breweries. 111 A shift in the dominant paradigm from
brewers in power to distributors in power, without the equivalent shift in the
regulatory framework, has resulted in a system where distribution rights are being
used to stifle and overpower craft breweries. 112
Section A delineates the benefits of the existing alcohol regulatory system that
protects competition.113 Section B analyzes the negative ways in which the
regulations can combine to inhibit growth and competition in the industry. 114
Section C explores the modern power imbalance in the relationships between the
three tiers as a result of the current regulatory system. 115
A. Protecting Competition in the Market
While this Comment is written to address the obstacles that the current
regulatory scheme imposes on craft beer, there are still components of the existing
regulations that aid in preventing horizontal and vertical integration and promoting
variety and competition. 116 The three-tier distribution system has succeeded in
preventing the pre-Prohibition tied-house evils by prohibiting manufacturers from
owning distributors or retailers. 117 There are also other practical advantages to
separating the three tiers.118 Separating production and distribution allows for a
more economically efficient system where each tier focuses on their own business
goals.119 Many craft brewers are small and lack the financial ability to distribute
their own product, and distribution companies offer the resources of warehousing
and trucks for shipping. 120 This, in turn, allows the brewers to focus on brewing
and the wholesalers to focus on distributing.121 Dedicating resources to one task
also allows small craft brewers to reach a larger consumer pool than would
otherwise be available through their own independent distribution companies. 122
The three-tier system has practical advantages on the retail and consumer end as

Pacific Law Review).
111. Kiser, supra note 19.
112. Id.
113. Infra Part IV.A.
114. Infra Part IV.B.
115. Infra Part IV.C.
116. Let’s Make Sure We Are Talking About the Same Things, supra note 24.
117. PECK, supra note 63, at 11.
118. Sorini, supra note 21.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id. (“In a world without independent distributors, small brewers would mostly be limited to
distributing in a very limited geographic area.”).
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well.123 Because of a distributor’s capacity to market multiple brands, retailers can
meet their demands by dealing with a few distributors that carry a wide variety of
products, rather than dealing with each individual manufacturer. 124
Beer franchise laws also provide benefits to the beer industry. 125 The
contractual protections franchise laws provide ensure that distributors are
independent and (mostly) free from brewer coercion and undue influence. 126 This
is particularly important to small independent craft brewers because distributors
often carry multiple brands. 127 Franchises are another restraint on Big Beer that
allow distributors to make the necessary investments to allow craft brands to
expand in the market. 128 A further upshot is that investment in craft brands is both
beneficial for brewers and independent distributors because a new and bigger
market for a beer means business for both the brewer and distributor. 129
To summarize, the three-tier system and franchise laws provide for a
middleman—the independent distributor.130 Independent distributors promote
temperance, allow brewers to focus on brewing while reaching a larger consumer
market, and offer retailers a larger selection of beer. 131
B. Inhibiting Craft Brewery Growth
Though there are proven upsides to the current regulatory system, it is also the
source of much frustration for craft breweries. 132 First and foremost, the existing
system creates barriers to entry that make it difficult for craft breweries to establish
a place in the market. 133 Although distributors provide investment to small craft
breweries, it may still be difficult for a new brewer to secure a distribution contract
because small and new brands do not have much value to distributors.134 The lack
of brand recognition may make it more difficult for a distributor to sell the product,

123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Benefits of Beer Franchise Laws, N AT’L BEER WHOLESALERS ASS’N, https://www.nbwa.org/govern
ment/benefits-of-beer-franchise-laws (last visited Jan. 6, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Sorini, supra note 21.
132. Id.
133. See Mike Reis, Beer Issues: What’s Up With the Three-Tier System?, SERIOUSEATS,
http://drinks.seriouseats.com/2014/01/craft-beer-three-tier-system-pros-cons-distributor-retailer-debate.html
(last visited Jan. 7, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that the three-tier
system has many negative effects with a disproportionate effect on small craft brewers).
134. David R. Scott, Brewing Up a New Century of Beer: How North Carolina Laws Stifle Competition in
the Beer Industry and How They Should Be Changed, 3 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 417, 427–28 (2013).
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and thus distributors may be unwilling to carry new brands. 135 Importantly,
distributors also require payment for the products they deliver, and small craft
brewers may lack the financial resources to both operate a production facility and
pay for distribution. 136 A brewery’s inability to find an agreeable distribution
contract can have dire consequences because the three-tier system was designed to
prevent breweries from distributing their own product, with few exceptions. 137
With the current distribution scheme, it is easy for the existing laws to stifle growth
and competition in the craft beer industry. 138
While the independence of the distribution tier is the cornerstone of this
regulatory system, it may also cause problems. 139 Because distributors are separate
entities, many business decisions concerning products are left to the discretion of
the distributor, if not provided for in the distribution agreement. 140 These include
decisions like advertising141 and shipping schedules. 142 While shipping times are
seemingly inconsequential, freshness is an important aspect to many craft beers,
and distributors delivering beers after their freshness date is a common issue.143
Brewers have also criticized distributors for the lack of transparency in their
relationships with other brewery clients.144 Another pertinent business decision
distributors may make without interference or oversight is the other clientbreweries that the company decides to associate with.145 While ownership interests
between the tiers are technically illegal, methods exist for brewers to assist or
incentivize distributors who prioritize that brewer’s product. 146 A problem arises
in this scenario because franchise laws make it very difficult for a brewery to leave
or break a contract with a distributor who treats it unfairly.147 To compound the
problem, the territorial exclusivity protection that franchise law provides
distributors makes it so that the contracted distributor is the only company with the
rights to distribute the beer.148 In the end, a brewery may be stuck with an
underperforming distributor because the distributor’s rights to the beer effectively

135. Id.
136. Id. at 427.
137. Reis, supra note 133.
138. Infra Part IV.C (explaining how the regulations can have negative effects on the relationships between
tiers).
139. See Reis, supra note 133 (listing the “Cons” of the three-tier system).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. BA Position Statements: Transparency in Brewer-Distributor Relationships, BREWERS ASS’N,
https://www.brewersassociation.org/government-affairs/ba-position-statements/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2017) (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
145. Id.
146. Bartz, supra note 53.
147. Reis, supra note 133.
148. Id.
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block a brewery from contracting with another distributor.149
The current alcohol regulatory system is a source of consternation for small
breweries that can either inhibit them from entering the market and expanding, or
otherwise trample their rights in the unfortunate event they contract with an
inadequate distributor.150
C. The Struggle of Unequal Bargaining Power
In today’s market, Big Beer is trying to cash in by riding the wake of the craft
beer explosion. 151 On top of craft brewery acquisitions, Big Beer is using any
advantage it can to profit on the thriving craft beer industry.152 Their tactics include
abusing the regulatory system to exploit its weaknesses.153
Examples of Big Beer’s abuse of the laws are AB InBev’s ownership of its
own distribution branch and its incentive program for “independent”
distributors.154 AB InBev’s distributors are contractually obligated to spend a
specified amount on advertising AB InBev products each year. 155 The announced
incentive program refunds 75% of the distributor’s advertising costs if AB InBev
beers make up at least 98% of the distributor’s sales. 156 This program is legal under
the current system, but creates an enticement to promote AB InBev beers to the
exclusion of other craft brands. 157
Among other things, AB InBev has a history of using its own advertisements
to target craft brewers; ranging from its 1997 assault on Boston Beer Company of
Sam Adams fame, 158 to Super Bowl ads in both 2015 and 2016 mocking the craft
beer culture as a whole. 159 Needless to say, Big Beer companies do not care about
the facets of craft beer that craft drinkers do: flavor, diversity, and community. 160
In the words of Tom McCormick, the Executive Director of the California Craft
149. Id.
150. See id. (listing the difficulties three tier imposes on small breweries).
151. Randall Benton, As Craft Beer Flourishes, Big Beer Continues to Buy in and Blur the Lines, S AC.
BEE (Dec. 2, 2016 8:00 AM), www.sacbee.com/food-drink/beer/article118258943.html (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
152. Id.
153. See Bartz, supra note 53 (explaining that AB InBev used a distributor incentive program to bypass
the prohibition of breweries owning interests in distributors).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Elizabeth Flock, Hopslam: How Big Beer Is Trying to Stop a Craft Beer Revolution, U.S. NEWS (Feb.
8, 2013, 2:49 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/02/08/hopslam-how-big-beer-is-trying-to-stopa-craft-beer-revolution (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
159. Brad Tuttle, Budweiser Doubles Down by Mocking Craft Beer Again in Super Bowl Ad, TIME (Feb.
6, 2016), time.com/money/4210344/budweiser-super-bowl-50-ad-mock-craft-beer/ (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review).
160. Benton, supra note 151.
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Brewer’s Association, Big Beer is now “utilizing nearly all of the tools in their
toolbox to capture the craft beer market.” 161
V. THE ANTITRUST ROADBLOCK
With the recent up-tic in mergers and acquisitions of craft breweries, federal
and state governments must take a more aggressive stance to ensure that Big Beer
does not consume the remainder of the beer market. 162 First, the federal
government—as it suggested it would—should examine Big Beer’s mergers and
acquisitions under an antitrust lens with regard to anticompetitive effects. 163 Then,
states should overhaul the existing system to accommodate the new craft beer
industry by creating a truly independent three-tier distribution system and
revamping franchise laws to match the current state of the industry. 164
Section A looks at the application of antitrust law to the beer industry through
the lens of past antitrust scrutiny of Big Beer mergers. 165 Section B discusses how
future applications of antitrust law could halt consolidation of the beer market. 166
A. Antitrust in the Craft Beer Industry
Popular sentiment, as well as statistics, show that the beer industry is on its
way to becoming a monopoly. 167 While craft beer put up a valiant effort in 2016
with a total dollar market share of 21.9%,168 four Big Beer companies comprise
nearly 80% of the market.169 The largest of those companies, AB InBev, is blurring
the lines of the three-tier system and flirting with vertical integration by purchasing
distributors, and even beer rating websites. 170
A major sign that antitrust is a plausible tool for defending competition laws
161. Id.
162. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, J USTICE DEPARTMENT REQUIRES ANHEUSER-BUSCH INBEV TO DIVEST
STAKE IN MILLERCOORS AND ALTER BEER DISTRIBUTOR PRACTICES AS PART OF SABMILLER ACQUISITION
(July 20, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-anheuser-busch-inbevdivest-stake-millercoors-and-alter-beer (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining the
Federal Government’s decision to block a Big Beer acquisition, requiring a divestiture of assets and change in
distribution practices).
163. Id.
164. Infra Part VI (suggesting changes to three-tier and franchise laws).
165. Infra Part V.A.
166. Infra Part V.B.
167. Supra Part II (stating that five Big Beer companies occupy over 80% of the beer market and listing
examples of people arguing the industry is becoming monopolized).
168. Press Release, Brewer’s Association, supra note 44.
169. Industry Fast Facts, supra note 46.
170. Jeff Spross, What Beer Reveals About Monopoly Power, THE WEEK (Nov. 9, 2017), http://theweek.
com/articles/736059/what-beer-reveals-about-monopoly-power (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review) (explaining how AB InBev used a wholly-owned subsidiary to purchase an interest in popular beer rating
website Ratebeer).
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in the market is AB InBev’s attempted acquisition of Grupo Modelo in 2013.171
The Justice Department blocked the acquisition by instituting an antitrust lawsuit,
citing anti-competitive motives related to price. 172 The DOJ reinforced its openness
to antitrust law in protecting the beer market again in 2016 when AB InBev
attempted to acquire SABMiller. 173 The DOJ forced AB InBev to, among other
things, divest its stake in MillerCoors before the transaction could continue. 174 In
a statement following the suit, the DOJ also promised to further scrutinize any
future acquisitions by AB InBev. 175 Following the completed transaction, over 90
of the beer market is controlled by AB InBev and MillerCoors in most local
markets.176
Several key laws empower the federal government to enforce antitrust laws. 177
The Sherman Act comprehensively outlaws monopolization and attempted
monopolization; the Federal Trade Commission Act outlaws unfair methods of
competition; and the Clayton Act prohibits transactions that may substantially
lessen “competition, or tend to create a monopoly.”178 The two antitrust suits
mentioned above were filed under the Section 7 of the Clayton Act based on the
apparent anticompetitive effects of the mergers. 179
To halt the further consolidation of the U.S. beer market, the DOJ should
review transactions of all Big Beer conglomerates, not just AB InBev, under a
strict antitrust analysis. 180 Focusing on the local anticompetitive effects of
acquisitions in regional markets would prevent consolidation. 181 Similar to the
DOJ’s involvement in the AB InBev-SABMiller transaction, focusing on the
effects of an acquisition on a regional level can show that the transaction may
substantially lessen competition in a given area.182 This is further evidenced by the
over 90% control by Big Beer in some local markets. 183
171. Davidson, supra note 49.
172. Id.
173. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 162.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Jim Koch, Is it Last Call for Craft Beer?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/04/07/opinion/is-it-last-call-for-craft-beer.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
177. The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Jan. 5, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
178. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
179. Complaint at 3, U.S. v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV & SABMiller (D.D.C. July 20, 2016) (No.
1:16-cv-01483) [hereinafter SABMiller Complaint]; Complaint at 5, U.S. v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV &
Grupo Modelo (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2013) (No. 1:13-cv-00127) [hereinafter Grupo Modelo Complaint].
180. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 162 (describing how the DOJ used an antitrust analysis to
prevent a complete merger of AB InBev and SABMiller).
181. Id. (explaining that the DOJ focused on the AB InBev–SABMiller acquisition’s effects on local
markets when deciding to block the acquisition).
182. Id.
183. SABMiller Complaint, supra note 179, at 16.
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If the DOJ upholds its promise to further review any of AB InBev’s craft
brewery acquisitions, it would promote competition and variety in the
marketplace.184 Halting the spread of Big Beer into the craft beer sector would not
only allow craft beer to continue to thrive but would afford it the opportunity to
grow un-harassed by the pressures of encroaching Big Beer.185
Examining the factors the DOJ relied on in its two previous antitrust suits
against AB InBev gives insight into how antitrust laws can be used to protect
competition in the beer market. 186 In both cases, the DOJ primarily relied on the
same factors in deciding whether to initiate litigation because the acquisition would
substantially lessen competition. 187 The DOJ cited four negative impacts the
proposed acquisition would have on the beer market: price control, concentration
of the market, elimination of head-to-head competition, and distribution effects.188
1. Price Control
Through a long chain of connected factual findings, the DOJ showed that the
merger of Big Beer companies affects the prices of beers both in regional markets
and across the nation. 189 Beer is different enough from other types of alcohol that
a monopolist in the beer market would be able to raise prices without the risk of
losing customers to another alcohol market.190 Demand in the beer market is also
location driven, thus customers are unlikely to venture to other geographical
markets due to price hikes. 191
Furthermore, brewers categorize beers in the market according to price: subpremium, premium, and high-end.192 The “high-end” segment generally consists
of imported and small craft beers, while other domestic beers make up the lower
tiers.193 Large breweries attempt to maintain price gaps between beers in each tier
to limit competition between the segments. 194 It is in this aspect that competition,
184. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 162.
185. See id. (showing the federal government’s willingness to use antitrust measures to prevent
anticompetitive conduct by large breweries in the beer market).
186. See SABMiller Complaint, supra note 179 (using four factors to argue the anticompetitive effects of
the mergers are illegal under the Clayton Act); Grupo Modelo Complaint, supra note 179 (applying the same
four factors).
187. See generally SABMiller Complaint, supra note 179, at 12–13 (listing the factors the DOJ used in
their antitrust analysis of the merger); Grupo Modelo Complaint, supra note 179, at 10–11 (same).
188. Competitive Impact Statement at 10, U.S. v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV & SABMiller (D.D.C.
July 20, 2016) (No. 1:16-cv-01483) [hereinafter SABMiller CIS]; Competitive Impact Statement at 1–2, U.S. v.
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV & Grupo Modelo (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2013) (No. 1:13-cv-00127) [hereinafter Grupo
Modelo CIS].
189. SABMiller CIS, supra note 188, at 7–8; Grupo Modelo CIS, supra note 188, at 6–7.
190. SABMiller CIS, supra note 188, at 6; Grupo Modelo CIS, supra note 188, at 6.
191. SABMiller CIS, supra note 188, at 7.
192. Id. at 6.
193. SABMiller Complaint, supra note 179, at 9; Grupo Modelo Complaint, supra note 179, at 9.
194. SABMiller Complaint, supra note 179, at 6.
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especially from the high-end segment, is an important constraint on market
prices.195
Big Beer typically employs national pricing strategies and AB InBev, world’s
largest brewer, leads the way. 196 As the industry leader, AB InBev announces its
price increases for the upcoming year using an intentionally transparent plan in
attempt to get other competing brands to follow. 197 Notably, MillerCoors, the
nation’s second-largest brewery, has routinely followed the same plan.198 As Big
Beer companies raise their prices, high-end and craft brewers become a threat
through “price gap compression.”199 Because Big Beer deals mostly in the subpremium and premium tiers, as the price gap between premium and high-end
lessens, consumers are more likely to switch to high-end beers.200 In response to
this price constraint, one of AB InBev’s stated goals is to “slow the volume trend
of High End Segment and [not] let the industry transform.” 201
To summarize the chain of findings, the isolation of regional beer markets
from outside competition allows price increases without the loss of business and a
high variety of prices between markets. 202 Competition from independent, highend and craft breweries is one of the few and important restraints on AB InBev’s
unilateral price-setting power.203 The DOJ relied on the likely anticompetitive
effects and resulting price hike in blocking the AB InBev-SABMiller merger.204
2. Market Concentration
The DOJ used market concentration as an indicator of “the level of competitive
vigor in a market and the likely effects of a merger.”205 It reasoned, “[t]he more
concentrated a market, and the more a transaction would increase concentration in
a market, the more likely it is that the transaction would result in harm to
consumers by meaningfully reducing competition.” 206 Under the DOJ’s antitrust
metrics, the U.S. beer market is considered highly concentrated.207
In both of the DOJ’s antitrust suits against AB InBev, the agency found that
the mergers would significantly increase the concentration in each relevant
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regional market. 208 Under the Clayton Act, the mergers and acquisitions were
found presumptively anticompetitive based on the existing market concentration
and the significant increase in concentration that would follow. 209 Practically
speaking, the DOJ examined the business’ total post-merger market share to
determine the anticompetitive effects and influence on the regional market. 210
3. Elimination of Head-to-Head Competition
In the Complaints of both antitrust suits, the DOJ reasoned that eliminating
head-to-head competition would substantially lessen competition in both national
and regional markets, in violation of the Clayton Act. 211 The DOJ’s analysis here
is similar to that of market concentration, but it examines the actual post-merger
effects of consolidation and the elimination of competition,212 as opposed to merely
creating a presumption from statistics.213 In practice, the consolidation will result
in two breweries under the direction of one organization, AB InBev. 214 The DOJ
stated the lack of head-to-head competition would negatively impact beer prices,
product innovation, and consumer choice. 215
Where two competing companies existed previously, the common ownership
of the two brands will likely result in a unilateral price increase under AB InBev’s
price control plan. 216 Further, the merger would stifle innovation because AB
InBev effectively owns the competing brand and has no incentive to develop a
competing product. 217 This is exemplified in the Grupo Modelo suit, where the
DOJ concluded that if the merger were to occur, AB InBev would lack the
economic motive to develop a competing Mexican-style craft brand.218 Lastly, less
competition and innovation results in a smaller variety of products in the market. 219
Ultimately, the DOJ considered the effects of the impending elimination of headto-head competition on price, choice, and innovation in instituting the antitrust
suits.220

208. Id.; Grupo Modelo Complaint, supra note 179, at 13.
209. SABMiller Complaint, supra note 179, at 11; Grupo Modelo Complaint, supra note 179, at 12.
210. SABMiller CIS, supra note 188, at 8.
211. SABMiller Complaint, supra note 179, at 11; Grupo Modelo Complaint, supra note 179, at 18.
212. Grupo Modelo Complaint, supra note 179, at 20.
213. See SABMiller Complaint, supra note 179, at 3 (explaining that a “market concentration” analysis
looks at the data on market concentration to predict likely anticompetitive effects if a merger were to happen).
214. SABMiller CIS, supra note 188, at 8.
215. Grupo Modelo Complaint, supra note 179, at 20.
216. Id. at 19.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. SABMiller Complaint, supra note 179, at 3.
220. Id. at 11–12; Grupo Modelo Complaint, supra note 179, at 18–19.
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4. Limiting Distribution
In the antitrust suit against AB InBev and MillerCoors, the DOJ examined the
merger’s anticompetitive effect of limiting high-end and craft distribution.221 In
2014, over 85% of the beer sold in the United States was distributed by a
MillerCoors affiliated wholesaler, AB InBev affiliated wholesaler, or a distributor
owned by AB InBev. 222 Furthermore, AB InBev has multiple financial incentive
programs and contractual provisions meant to promote exclusivity with
distributors that sell AB InBev beer.223 AB InBev beers account for almost 90% of
the volume of sales of an affiliated distributor. 224 The remaining sales volume is
composed of high-end craft brewers with limited sales and high operating costs. 225
If AB InBev acquires MillerCoors, it is likely that AB InBev would use the
same anticompetitive tactics to promote exclusivity of MillerCoors beer. 226 The
two largest brewing companies would promote exclusivity of their brands to the
detriment of competing high-end brands.227 While distribution seems like a topic
better left for Congress, the anticompetitive effects of a merger on distribution are
but one factor the DOJ considered in bringing the antitrust suit.228
B. Why Antitrust is a Viable Solution
Both cases mentioned above use nearly identical solutions to prevent the
anticompetitive effects of the mergers.229 The DOJ required the acquiring company
to divest assets and ownership interests in portions of the businesses operating in
the U.S.230 The remedy attempts to maintain and encourage competition in the U.S.
beer market by ensuring that the divested businesses remain viable competitors in
the market.231 Preserving the independence of breweries promotes competition and
acts as an important price constraint on Big Beer. 232 The DOJ also imposed certain
conditions on AB InBev’s distribution incentives and practices to limit the negative

221. SABMiller Complaint, supra note 179, at 12.
222. SABMiller CIS, supra note 188, at 10.
223. SABMiller Complaint, supra note 179, at 3.
224. SABMiller CIS, supra note 188, at 9.
225. SABMiller Complaint, supra note 179, at 7.
226. Id. at 3.
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228. Id. at 12.
229. See generally Proposed Final Judgment, U.S. v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV & SABMiller
(D.D.C. July 20, 2016) (No. 1:16-cv-01483) [hereinafter SABMiller Proposed Final Judgment]; Final Judgment,
U.S. v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV & Grupo Modelo (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2013) (No. 1:13-cv-00127) [hereinafter
Grupo Modelo Final Judgment] (using the same four-factored analysis to partially block the Grupo Modelo
merger).
230. SABMiller CIS, supra note 188, at 2; Grupo Modelo CIS, supra note 188, at 2.
231. SABMiller CIS, supra note 188, at 16.
232. Grupo Modelo CIS, supra note 188, at 10.
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impact on high-end beers.233
Lastly, the DOJ required AB InBev to provide advanced notice of any plan to
acquire a brewer or distributor to the Antitrust Division to determine whether the
acquisition is likely to substantially lessen competition. 234 While the two antitrust
suits were instigated against Big Beer companies, this provision applies generally
to breweries of any size. 235 The lack of limiting language shows that the DOJ is
open to performing the antitrust analysis on acquisitions of any size, including craft
breweries.236
VI. STATE REGULATIONS
Federal antitrust law is only the first step in preventing market
consolidation. 237 States should still overhaul the existing regulatory system to
accommodate the new craft beer industry by creating a truly independent three-tier
distribution system and revamping franchise laws to match the current state of the
industry.238 Section A discusses the necessity of revising three-tier laws to fit
today’s market. 239 Section B explores methods of amending franchise laws to fit
the modern three-tier model.240
A. Retain and Adjust the Three-Tier System
The three-tier distribution system plays a critical role in leveling the playing
field for breweries, as well as ensuring that we do not revert back to the old ways
of the tier-house.241 The three-tier distribution system is imperative to protecting
the interests of craft beer and promoting variety and competition, while also
keeping Big Beer at bay. 242 Nevertheless, the three-tier system should be
reconfigured so that the middle tier—distributors—are truly independent.243
The current three-tier distribution system allows intermixing of brewers and
distributors, which borders on vertical integration. 244 While AB InBev’s above
233. SABMiller CIS, supra note 188, at 15.
234. SABMiller Proposed Final Judgment, supra note 229, at 28; SABMiller CIS, supra note 188, at 25.
235. Id.
236. SABMiller Proposed Final Judgment, supra note 229, at 28; SABMiller CIS, supra note 188, at 25
(qualifying the reporting requirements with numbers, rather than being AB InBev specific).
237. Infra Part VI.
238. Infra Part VI.A–B.
239. Infra Part VI.A.
240. Infra Part VI.B.
241. See Sorini, supra note 21 (discussing the legislative purpose of the three-tier system, as well as its
other advantages).
242. Let’s Make Sure We Are Talking About the Same Things, supra note 24.
243. Compare Bartz, supra note 53 (illustrating how most distributors are aligned with one of two big
brewers and legal incentive programs employed by AB InBev affect the independence of distributors).
244. See Koch, supra note 176 (stating that the current system has allowed 90% of distributors to be

423

2019 / Preventing Consolidation of the Craft Beer Market
mentioned distributor incentive program245 was eventually blocked for
anticompetitive effects as part of the DOJ’s review of the SABMiller acquisition,
it is an otherwise legal program. 246 Although the incentive program was prohibited
in this instance, the piecemeal review process would be ineffective in catching all
instances of this type of incentive conduct. 247
While the three-tier system is imperative to promoting competition and should
not be repealed, states should apply more strict statutes regulating relationships
between the three-tiers, especially brewers and distributors.248 Disallowing any
financial interest, either directly or indirectly, would further the goal of having a
true independent distributor who is free from coercion by large brewers.249 The
freedom to act independent from coercion or undue influence from large corporate
brewers would remove another entrance barrier to the craft beer market and give
small breweries the opportunity to expand, with the help of distributors. 250
B. One Size Franchise Law Does Not Fit All
While franchise laws still protect distributors against abuses from large
brewers, the system is antiquated and does more harm than good by stifling small
craft brewers.251 Today, large brewers in Big Beer still hold enough power to
represent similar threats, but distributors have decreased in number and increased
in size to gain some of their own power. 252 Now, small brewers are at a
disadvantaged tier when it comes to bargaining power, and the laws should reflect
this shift.253
The simplest solution is to provide an outright exemption to the beer franchise
laws for brewers who produce below a certain volume. 254 The exemption would
allow small brewers the flexibility to modify terms or change distributors to
receive the best possible access to the market. 255 If a state finds a complete
exemption too extreme, following an approach like the state of New York by
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246. SABMiller Complaint, supra note 179, at 3.
247. See id. (requiring the DOJ and court to look into specific practices of AB InBev to determine whether
the conduct was anticompetitive).
248. See Anhalt, supra note 55, at 195 (advocating for strict three tier laws, as well as anti-coercion laws).
249. Id. at 197.
250. See id. (“[T]he current laws regulating distribution often inhibit new and small breweries’ abilities to
reach new markets by limiting the opportunity to self-distribute to retailers and directly sell to consumers”).
251. Burt Watson, Franchise Laws: Leveling the Playing Field, BREWERS ASS’N (Dec. 17, 2014),
https://www.brewersassociation.org/insights/franchise-laws/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
252. Hindy, supra note 88.
253. Id.
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creating special carveouts in the franchise laws may be more appropriate. 256 New
York’s carveout for small brewers allows them to terminate a contract by paying
fair market value for distribution rights, which is less restrictive than traditional
franchise laws and cheaper than litigation. 257
Another solution may be to relax the laws on direct-sale and selfdistribution.258 While some states have already allowed direct-sale, selfdistribution, or both, ensuring that all small breweries have the opportunity to sell
their own product makes establishing themselves in the market place an easier
feat.259 Allowing breweries to sell their own products solves the issue of
distributors’ lack of interest in new brewers with little value.260 Exempting only
small brewers will allow them to establish themselves in the market and
subsequently move on to third-party independent distributors, becoming a
functioning member of the three-tier system. 261
Although large brewing companies present threats the alcohol regulatory
system was designed to safeguard against, small craft breweries break the mold. 262
Exempting small brewers from the three-tiered scheme and beer franchise laws
alleviates regulatory suppression and affords them a chance to grow. 263 Providing
an exemption to the regulatory system for craft brewers is vital to the survival of
the industry.264
VII. CONCLUSION
The trend of craft breweries selling to Big Beer is a direct result of the
American alcohol regulatory scheme. 265 The existing three-tier distribution system
and beer franchise laws have become dated and out of touch with the realities of
the rapid growth of small craft breweries in the current market.266 The antiquated
system is advantageous to Big Beer conglomerates, who utilize any benefit they
can to retain a large market share. 267
In order to ensure the survival of the craft beer industry and promote its culture
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of variety, diversity, and competition, both federal and state governments must
work to prevent the monopolization and consolidation of the market. 268 To halt the
increasing consolidation of the market, the DOJ should utilize existing antitrust
measures that it has recently applied to review and scrutinize transactions of Big
Beer conglomerates for monopolistic or anticompetitive effects. 269 In the
meantime, states should revamp their own regulatory systems to give small craft
brewers an opportunity to succeed. 270 Retaining and even tightening down on the
three-tier system to eliminate as much intermingling of the tiers as possible ensures
the distribution tier is truly neutral and independent—vital qualities to guarantee
that craft brewers are able to compete effectively and each retailer has a large
variety of beer. 271 Lastly, exempting small brewers from the distribution and
franchise laws and allowing them to sell their own products would eliminate the
inherent advantage given to large brewers and distributors. 272 While the
distribution laws are slowly evolving to accommodate the modern industry, 273
moving on from the post-Prohibition era regulations in a manner that benefits the
growing craft beer sector will ensure that the beer industry continues to be
competitive and provides consumers with a wide variety of their favorite drink. 274
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